Today marks the 30th anniversary of Piper Alpha when a number 0f explosions ripped through the offshore installation killing 167 workers and left the lives of 61 survivors and their families changed forever as the impact of surviving such a tragedy took a toll, both physically and psychologically on survivors and their loved ones.
The inquiry into the disaster headed by Lord Cullen was to hear from many witnesses as the chain of events and health and safety failures unfolded that led to the hydrocarbon release and its ignition that causing the wholesale devesation that left 167 families bereaved.
The findings of the inquiry and Lord Cullen’s recommendations were to change the health and safety landscape on the UK Continental Shelf forever. Or did they?
Perhaps the two key recommendations were stripping the Department of Energy of responsibility for safety regulation offshore and proposals to develop a safety case regime.
Thr first recommendation was felt necessary to avoid what had been a clear conflict of interest, whereby the Government department setting our energy policy also had responsibility for enforcement of health and safety regulations within the offshore industry.
The second was Lord Cullen’s view that the offshore industry should develop a safety case regime similar to that in the United Kingdom nuclear industry, where offshore installation operators have to develop a health and safety plan that demonstrates to the HSE their compliance with relavant safety regulations.
The first Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations came into force in 1992 and place, among other things, a duty on installation operators to develop and implement safety cases that meet HSE approval and to review safety cases every 3 years; however the later Offshore Installations (Safety Case) 2o05 regulations relaxed this duty and now safety cases apply throughout the life of an installation with certain circumstances dictating when a revision is required.
This relaxation was driven by industry leaders pedalling the over burdensome regulatory burdens myth while apparently forgetting the reason the safety case regime was introduced in the first place.
What is concerning is that, even taking into account the less burdensome regime, opearators still do not appear to grasp what the safety case compels them to do.
In a 2016 court case reported in IOSH Magazine Conoco Philips were fined £3 million (£1million for each offence)after pleading guilty to 3 hydrocarbon releases in 2 days in 2012 (24 years after Piper Alpha and 20 years after the safety case regulations were introduced), they had the audacity to appeal the level of the fine, however the appeal judges were having none it,
At the appeal hearing, Judge Treacy told the court: “The risk involved was foreseeable and significant. If the gas had ignited the risk to personnel of death or serious was extremely high […] All 66 occupants of the platform had been put at significant risk.
If safety cases provide well documented reasoned argument to demonstrate compliance with health and safety laws why did these leaks happen, why are so many offshore workers continuing to be at risk from hydro carbon realeases and why has the HSE’s Head of Energy Division Cliff Flint felt compelled to write to operators urging industry senior leaders to assess their operations and to reflect on the learning from incidents across the process industries to identify where improvements can be made.
More recently the Offshore Installations (Safety Case Regulations) 2015 places a duty on operators to evidence proper consultation with safety reps on preparation or revision of a safety case and how their views have been taken into account and, if not, provide reasons why not. Further provision was made in these regulations ensuring duty holders make adequate arrangements to communicate national arrangements for anonymously reporting health and safety concerns.
These two particular provisions are welcome and provide opportunity to ensure the views of workers are taken into account when developing the safety case and for the first time should have confidence in reporting health and safety concerns anonymously. However to have any chance of success thes provisions have to have the confidence of the workforce, this can only be achived by strong enforcement to ensure adherence to safety cases by operators and action taken against those that do not.
Strong words from Chris Flint have to be backed up by strong enforcement activity and workers need to see evidence of anonymous complaints being taken seriously.
Scottish Hazards supports unions working in the sector, there should never be another Piper Alpha and there should be no compromise on safety during economic downturns or when oil prices plummet.
The concept of fair work should apply as equally on offshore platforms as it does in onshore workplaces, trade unions can provide the most effectice voice for offshore workers, especially a health and safety voice.
Without that voice, creating the health and safety culture offshore HSE, Chris Flint says is needed for workers to feel confident in reporting concerns will remain a pipe dream for offshore workers and hydrocarbon releases of the type that caused 167 death on Piper Alpha in 1988 and put 66 Conoco Phillips workers at risk 24 years later will continue to happen.
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